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Abstract
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders.
I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and
cancellation as good as possible. In a ﬁrst step, an intensity-based pricing model
of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I
calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical
work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all
eﬀects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enable me to compare options
for top executives with those for subordinates. I ﬁnd no price diﬀerences. The model
is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs,
SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly
accurate prices.
JEL classiﬁcation: G13; J33; M41; M52
Keywords: Employee stock options; Executive stock options; Exercise Behavior;
Fair value accounting; Timing risk
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Employee stock options (ESOs) are a popular instrument to align the interests of employ-
ees to those of owners. This paper focuses on the cost of such options to shareholders.
There are two main issues speciﬁc to ESOs that are relevant in this context. First,
most grantees exercise the options considerably earlier than standard option pricing theory
predicts. Second, cancellations before expiry are no less important. Underwater options,
1for instance, held by an employee who is leaving the ﬁrm, are forfeited shortly after the
end of the labor contract. In this way, staﬀ and management turnover have substantial
impact on the cost of ESOs.
No matter what the reasons are, all valuation models have to incorporate early exercise
and cancellation. There are two main types of valuation models. Type One tries to
explain why option holders follow a certain exercise pattern. I call such a model rational.
Type Two, which I call heuristic, attempts to describe the stochastics of exercise and
cancellation in a correct way. A proper description is fully adequate for the sole purpose
of option pricing from a shareholder’s perspective.1
This study follows the heuristic approach. I present a pricing method that seeks to
replicate the empirics of early exercise and cancellation as good as possible.
1.1 Why Focus on Empirics?
Of course, from a theoretical point of view it is more appealing to analyze the reasons
behind early exercise and cancellations. But rational models widely rely on hard-to-
determine utility concepts. The utility function and factors like borrowing constraints,
size and frequency of liquidity shocks, stock ownership or initial wealth, as well as the
time to retirement should play an important role in the modelling of exercise decisions
— and they will be important in practice. Nevertheless, it is very diﬃcult to get reliable
information on the interaction of all of these factors.
The nature of such measurement problems is not just academic but also relevant
for accounting. Suppose that the accounting standard for ESOs implements a pricing
methodology that relies on a utility function. If the function is not speciﬁed in particular,
there is large discretion on the reported option value left to the accountant. From that
point of view, a precise deﬁnition is desirable. But a rational model also determines —
explicitly or implicitly — the option’s value to the employee. Thus, a rational model in
the rank of an oﬃcial accounting rule aﬀects the interests of more people than a heuristic
model. There is more danger of political and legal discussions on the deﬁnitions that
typically result in an extreme position in favor of the party with higher bargaining power.
As an example how the result could look like, remember that ESOs, granted in the context
1Provided that the probability law of stock price movements accounts for the incentives provided by
stock options.
2of an IPO, may be valued at zero volatility since a historical volatility is not available — the
political outcome of a much less-serious measurement problem. Such problems in mind,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is well advised to focus on descriptive
aspects of exercise and cancellation, which are much easier to be objectiﬁed.
Besides shareholders, investment banks might also be interested in prices and ESO
hedging strategies that focus on empirical aspects. It is not uncommon to out-source
provision and settlement of ESOs to investment banks. So the bank writes the option,
being less interested in economic rationales for the option holder’s exercise decisions but
a good hedge for risky obligations.
1.2 A Heuristic Pricing Model
The heuristic approach of the present study is new as it does not presume a certain
exercise strategy in advance.
In a ﬁrst step, a general intensity-based pricing model similar to El Karoui and
Martellini [KM01] is developed. The framework is general enough to incorporate a large
variety of derivatives, provided that the option payoﬀ is well-deﬁned at the time of exer-
cise. It is based on the absence of arbitrage and the assumption that employees have no
private information on future stock prices. Furthermore, it is assumed that the remaining
unhedgeable risk is idiosyncratic to employees and not priced by shareholders.
In a second step, I show that it is possible to calibrate the model with a regression
analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The
model generates a nearly ideal ﬁt with all information that is captured in the regression.
In this sense, the model determines ESO prices at a new degree of precision. So it may
be useful as a reference for other pricing models.
Separate regressions for diﬀerent employee levels enable me to investigate if options
held by top executives are possibly more (or less) costly than those held by subordinates.
There is no evidence of essential diﬀerences.
In a further analysis I check whether all of the path-dependent regressors involved
are really necessary to make the valuation precise. By varying the sensitivity to certain
exercise drivers, I look at changes in the option value. Only about the half of regressors
are relevant, yet a reduced model, with all insensitive regressors removed, still includes
path-dependent components.
31.3 How Accurate Is SFAS 123?
SFAS 123, the relevant standard for the accounting of ESOs, suggests a simple heuristic
model that reﬂects early exercise and cancellation as follows: First, the dividend-adjusted
Black/Scholes price is calculated with a maturity equal to the expected lifetime of the
option, given that it vests. In order to correct for premature forfeiture of options, the
resulting B/S price is multiplied by the probability that the option vests. I will refer to
this procedure as the SFAS method. The FASB obviously attached importance to keeping
things simple. That is desirable — the simpler the procedure, the less discretion is left
to the accountant — but it raises the question whether a plain model possibly blinds out
important value drivers.
For the lack of market prices, the SFAS method must be validated with reference mod-
els, in the hope of getting closer to the truth with the latter. Due to the large number
of factors my model accounts for, I hope to provide good reference prices. Earlier stud-
ies, working with reference models as well, found little evidence that the SFAS method
performs dramatically wrong, supposed that the reference model is true and input para-
meters are reliable.2 So does this study. Computing SFAS prices, based on inputs that
are “observed” in the world of my model, I ﬁnd that the SFAS method is a robust proxy
with a small downward bias.
1.4 Previous Research
As stated above, I classify approaches to modelling exercise behavior into rational and
heuristic. By adjusting Black-Scholes, the — heuristic — SFAS method implicitly picks a
certain exercise policy: Ignoring the (weak) concavity-in-time of the Black-Scholes price,
the SFAS price is correct if options are terminated (cancelled or exercised) at some in-
dependent random time — regardless of moneyness and vesting.3 However, as Rubinstein
[Rub95] argues, independency of stock price path and termination time is rather implau-
sible for several reasons. Furthermore, it is easy to generate exercise policies that keep the
SFAS inputs constant but generate a quite diﬀerent payoﬀ structure and thus diﬀerent
option values.
The heuristic approach of Jennergren and Näslund ([JN93] and [JN95]) is closely
2See Carpenter [Car98] and Raupach [Rau03].
3Provided that the remaining risk arising from imperfect hedging is not priced.
4related to the concept of independent termination. The authors introduce an independent
exponentially distributed stopping time as a proxy for option holders who leave the ﬁrm.
The option, if stopped, is liquidated at its current intrinsic value. If not stopped, the
option considered in [JN95] pays oﬀ only at expiry (like a European option), which allows
for a nearly closed pricing formula. The model can be seen as the prototype of independent
termination. The American counterpart is discussed in [JN93]: Given that the option is
not stopped, the risk-neutral holder freely decides on exercise.
Rubinstein [Rub95] notes that it is diﬃcult to get reliable estimates of relevant input
factors. The option value as suggested by Rubinstein gives a rather radical lower bound
of prices but is based on few (and reliable) factors. Such simple estimates are easier to be
compared between ﬁrms. Yet, the question whether a stock options program has positive
value, if seen as an investment in incentives, is then even harder to be answered.
Several authors have modeled the rationales behind early exercise and cancellation
by a utility-maximizing behavior of restricted option holders. For instance, Kulatilaka
and Marcus [KM94], Huddart [Hud94], Rubinstein [Rub95], or Hall and Murphy [HM02]
assume that a representative risk-averse individual continuously decides on holding the
option or exercising it and investing the proceeds in the riskless asset. Carpenter [Car98]
generalizes the setting with regard to the portfolio where the proceeds of exercises are
invested. She introduces additional randomness by a headhunter, occasionally turning
up at the employee’s and oﬀering a new job, changing in this way the current basis for
decision. Furthermore, Carpenter compares the heuristic model of Jennergren and Näs-
lund [JN93] with her rational model. She ﬁnds that the three-parameter rational model
neither ﬁts with a sample of exercises better than the one-parameter model with inde-
pendent stopping, nor has it a higher predictive power. The heuristic model gives prices
strikingly similar to that of the SFAS approach, thus supporting the appropriateness of
SFAS 123. Raupach [Rau03] also generalizes the Jennergren and Näslund model [JN93],
focusing on a good ﬁt with empirics. He supposes the option to be exercised at an expo-
nentially growing or constant barrier if it has not been stopped exogenously. Like in the
present paper, the model is used as a reference for the SFAS method. Resulting prices are
similar. Hull and White [HW03] suggest a pricing model that is basically a particular case
of [Rau03] in a binomial framework. Carr and Linetsky [CL00] generalize Jennergren and
Näslund’s concept of a constant hazard rate of stopping to rates depending on time and
current stock price. Particular cases allow for solving parts of the evaluation analytically.
5El Karoui and Martellini [KM01] develop a more general theoretical framework for the
pricing of assets with uncertain time-horizon, which is based on continuous-time hazard
rates as well. The concept of conditional independence, which is central in the technical
framework of my paper, is closely related to the ideas of El Karoui and Martellini.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the general pricing framework.
Section 3 summarizes some empirical results of the work of Huddart and Lang. In Section
4, the model is applied to a typical ESO design and calibrated with regressions. Section
5 presents prices and tests the SFAS method. Furthermore, I determine what individual
exercise drivers in the regressions are relevant for prices. Section 6 concludes. Some
evidence on management turnover and a number of proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 A General Pricing Model
This section develops a general framework which allows to derive a unique price of ESOs
from arbitrage and diversiﬁcation arguments. I will present a hedging strategy for a
large class of derivatives that minimizes the variance of the hedging error. Provided that
the remaining risk is not priced, the price of an option is then the value of the hedge.
The hedging strategy also makes explicit what information is essential in order to price
ESOs correctly. The model is based on ideas similar to those of El Karoui and Martellini
[KM01].
2.1 Assumptions
Let a vector price process X of traded securities be given with paths in C := C ([0,T],Rn),
and a ﬁltration F =(Ft)t≥0 on a complete probability space [Ω,F,P].T h e r ei sam o n e y
market account paying out a constant yield rate r.G i v e naﬁxed time t, I assume every
integrable, Ft-measurable contingent claim to be perfectly replicable by continuous trad-
ing in X and the money market account. For instance, this holds if F is augmented and
(X,F) is a continuous semimartingale, following a stochastic diﬀerential equation with
smooth coeﬃcients. In the sequel, I assume all random variables to be square integrable.
To specify some terms, I mean by termination the end of the option contract for any
reason. Terminations at a positive payoﬀ are called exercises,a n dcancellations otherwise.
Iu s eforfeiture as a synonym of cancellation.
6The option payoﬀ is deﬁned by a mapping f :[ 0 ,T] × C → R+. I fa no p t i o ni s
terminated at time t, the holder receives cash in the amount of f (t,X) ≥ 0.T h ep a y o ﬀ
shall be uniquely determined by the path of X up to t.4 The set of possible times of
termination is restricted to a ﬁnal set5 {t1,...,t K}. Restricting the determinants of the
payoﬀ to t and X precludes that in-the-money options are cancelled, possibly due to
explicit disciplinary clauses in the option contract.
The deﬁnition of payoﬀ is ﬂexible enough to cover features like vesting periods or
non-exercise windows. As well, outperformance options or hurdles ﬁt into the framework
the same as path-dependent derivatives like Asian options.
Most of the assumptions could be weakened, yet I will forego generality in favor of
compactness.
Following the methodology of heuristic models, I do not explicitly specify how an
option holder arrives at an exercise decision. I assume that there is a random time τ with
values in {t1,...,t K}, at which the option pays out f (τ,X) (the total of cancellations
simply appears to be {f (τ,X)=0 }). The joint law of τ and X is assumed to be common
knowledge.
The following assumption is key to the possibility of hedging: At every time, the
current decision on termination and the future development of the price process are in-
dependent. Formally, I assume
P(τ>t , X∈ B |Ft)=P(τ>t |Ft) P(X ∈ B |Ft)
for t ∈ {t1,...,t K} and Borel sets B ∈ B(C ([0,T])). I call the property conditional
independence. It is equivalent6 to the K-assumption
P(τ>t|Ft)=P(τ>t|FT ), (1)
to be found in [KM01] or [MS79]. Conditional independence is not total independence
of exercise decisions and X. Quite the contrary, the intuition behind is an option holder
4Formally, f (t,·) shall be measurable with B([0,t]), the sub-σ-algebra of Borel sets in C that is
generated by the natural projection C → C ([0,t],Rn).
5El Karoui and Martellini [KM01] as well as Carr and Linetsky [CL00] use continuous intensities of
exercise, which seems at least partially inappropriate for ESO since the distribution of exercise time
will jump at maturity and vesting dates. See Huddart and Lang [HL96, ﬁg. 1] for empirical support.
Admitting continuous-time but degenerate distributions is possible but makes the model cumbersome.
6A proof is found in the appendix, Section 7.2.
7who might experience idiosyncratic impulses, to be intractable by the option writer, but
takes all past market information into consideration when deciding whether to terminate
options. Idiosyncratic impulses could be sudden liquidity need, an alternative job oppor-
tunity, serious illness and things like that. The only restriction imposed by conditional
independence is that a termination in t has nothing to do with the further development of
X after t. In other words, option holders do not condition exercise on private information
about the future development of stock prices.7 Note that the path of X on [0,t] may
even enforce termination in t. For instance, the optimal, deterministic exercise strategy
for a traded American option is covered as well. In this case, P(τ>t|Ft) ∈ {0,1},a n d
conditional independence is trivially given.
2.2 Hedging Strategy
The writer of an ESO — shareholders or an investment bank, servicing the claims arising
from ESO exercises — has to pay f (τ,X) in τ.Ia s s u m et h a ts h eﬁnances this payoﬀ by
borrowing it from the money market at the riskless rate of interest just in τ until maturity.
Doing so does not narrow her action space. Following this strategy, the option writer has
to pay back H := er(T−τ)f (τ,X) to the money market in T. To hedge this liability, she
implements a replicating strategy that matures in T as well. It is quite easy to determine
the variance-optimal hedge at an abstract level.
Lemma 1 Among all payoﬀs that can be replicated by trading in the money market ac-
count and X, the contingent claim
H
∗ := E
P ¡
e
r(T−τ)f (τ,X)|FT
¢
(2)
approximates H best in L2 (P), i.e., it minimizes the variance of the hedging error. The
error has a mean of zero.
Proof. Due to FT-measurability, H∗ can be replicated by trading in X and the money
market. Minimal variance and zero expectation for H∗ − H are elementary properties of
conditional expectations.
7There is empirical evidence that ESO holders process private information when deciding on exercise.
For instance, Huddart and Lang [HL03] report abnormal stock returns following high rates of ESO
exercise. I have to ignore this to keep things simple.
8Despite its formal elegance, representation (2) of H∗ is rather unmanageable. In order
to derive an appropriate hedging rule, I disaggregate the random payoﬀ across time: Set
for some ﬁxed t
Πt := I{τ=t} f (t,X).
The sum of all Πt returns f (τ,X). Putting this into (2) and applying conditional inde-
pendence (1) yields
H
∗ = E
P
Ã
e
r(T−τ) X
t
Πt
¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯
FT
!
=
X
t
e
r(T−t)f (t,X)E
P ¡
I{τ=t} |FT
¢
=
X
t
e
r(T−t)f (t,X)P(τ = t|Ft). (3)
Hedging H by H∗ can now be reinterpreted as follows.
• For every t ∈ {t1,...,t K}, implement a bundle of replicating strategies, each paying
f (t,X)P(τ = t|Ft) in t.
• Aggregate the diﬀerences f (t,X)
¡
P(τ = t|Ft) − I{τ=t}
¢
in the money market ac-
count until T.
2.3 Price
Like other authors8, I will assume that the risk of imperfect hedging is not priced. The
option price is then immediately derived from the hedging strategy. The following two
propositions give examples how the absence of a risk premium for the unhedgeable risk
could be reasoned. Proposition 2 uses a CAPM argument, whereas Proposition 3 assumes
that the error can be diversiﬁed away.
Proposition 2 Suppose that X covers all assets in the market. The hedging error H∗−H
is then uncorrelated with each asset and every FT-measurable contingent claim. Hence, a
well-diversiﬁed option writer will set the value of the hedging error equal to its discounted
expected value, which is zero.
Proof. Let Y be an FT-measurable random variable. By deﬁnition, H∗ = EP (H |FT ),
and therefore
cov(H
∗ − H,Y)=E
P (H
∗ − H)Y = E
P E
P ((H
∗ − H)Y |FT )
= E
P (H
∗ − H
∗)Y =0.
8See Jennergren and Näslund [JN95], [JN93], or Carpenter [Car98], for example.
9Proposition 3 Assume that the option writer has granted ESOs to a large number of
employees i.L e t t h e e x e r c i s e t i m e s τi follow a distribution common to each, and let
furthermore all exercise decisions and X be conditionally independent.9 If the number of
employees tends to ∞ and if, furthermore, the proportional share of the largest option
package vanishes as well, the proportional hedging error vanishes in L2 (P).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
let a ﬁxed price path scenario be given from 0 to T, and let the number of options granted
be equal to each employee. Then, the cash ﬂows will accrue at an approximate density of
f (t,X)P(τ = t|Ft) over the timeline.
The proof immediately follows from the Strong Law of Large Numbers under P (·| F t),
and is therefore omitted.
If no premium is paid for bearing the unhedgeable remaining risk, the cost of an
ESO to shareholders equals that of its hedging portfolio, the latter of which allows for
application of the standard option pricing theory. Let be Q the equivalent martingale
measure, which is unique by the assumptions made at the beginning. By (3),
price = EQe
−rTH
∗ =
X
t
e
−rtEQ [f (t,X)P(τ = t|Ft)]. (4)
Furthermore, the completeness assumptions on X from Section 2.1 ensure that
P(τ = t|Ft)=Q(τ = t|Ft),
i.e., the conditional probability of exercise remains unaﬀected by the change of measure.10
Then (4) simpliﬁes to
price =
X
t
e
−rtEQ [f (t,X)Q(τ = t|Ft)] = EQe
−rτf (τ,X). (5)
In other words, an ESO is priced as if perfectly hedgeable or, equivalently, if τ were an
F-stopping time. This formula has already been used in earlier work.11 In the context of
this paper, however, the disaggregated representation on the right side of (4) turns out
to be more useful. It provides an opportunity to directly transfer empirical evidence on
termination rates into prices.
9Formally, the indicators I{τi>t} and X are to be independent under P (·| F t) for all t.
10See appendix, Lemma 6.
11See Jennergren and Näslund [JN93], [JN95] or Carpenter [Car98], for example.
103 Drivers of Exercise Probability
Since the early 90’s, when the SEC implemented the disclosure of executive stock option
plans, data on stock option grants has grown considerably. Yet, precise data on exercise is
still scarce. Even matching EXECUCOMP with insider trades does not enable to uniquely
determine when a certain option package was exercised, not to mention terminations. In
this context, the dataset collected by Steven Huddart and Mark Lang is unique. It contains
detailed information on stock option grants plus exercises of about 58,000 employees from
7 publicly traded ﬁrms between 1985 and 1994. The options run over 5 to 10 years, with
am a j o r i t yo n1 0y e a r s .
The dataset was analyzed in several articles: Huddart and Lang [HL96], [HL03], Hud-
dart [Hud98], [Hud99], and Heath, Huddart and Lang [HHL99]. I will calibrate my option
pricing model with results from this work.
In [HL96], the authors choose a grant month to be an observation, where a grant is
the total of all options given to employees at one day in one ﬁrm. Every month through
the lifetime of an option is a candidate for being an observation, whereas some have been
eliminated: “We exclude observations for which the strike price exceeded the mid-month
market price, observations after a grant was fully exercised, and observations before the
ﬁrst vesting date since little or no exercise would occur in those cases.” The aggregation
ends up with a number of 5,060 observations. The authors do tobit and weighted OLS
regressions of the option exercise rate on independent variables such as characteristics of
the time series of past stock prices or factors that relate to an option’s life stage such as
dummies for options being recently vested or those expiring soon. Table 1 summarizes
deﬁn i t i o n so fr e g r e s s o r sa n dc o e ﬃcients utilized in this paper. The dependent variable
is called fraction exercised,d e ﬁned as “the ratio of options exercised in a month to total
options in the grant”. Note that fraction exercised is not a hazard rate since it does
not refer to the number of options remaining from earlier terminations but the total
of options granted. Fraction exercised corresponds to the probability of an option to
be exercised in a certain month and to have been unexercised so far (instead of “given
that...”). Regressions are conducted, ﬁrst, for all ﬁrms in the sample12; second, for each
ﬁrm separately; and third, for diﬀerent classes of the employee level, sorted by the number
of options each person is granted.
12The employee-owned ﬁrm “H” is left out.
11With similar OLS regressions on the same database, the paper [HHL99] of Heath,
Huddart, and Lang focuses on “psychological factors (...) above and beyond the rational
factors considered in standard models of exercise”. Main diﬀerences between [HHL99]
and [HL96] are grant weeks as observations instead of months, slightly diﬀerent criteria
for cutting out a grant week, and some diﬀerent regressors. One of the ﬁndings is that
whether or not the recent stock price is larger than all prices through the last year has
major impact on the exercise rate. As well, several short-term returns have strong impact.
Essential regression results and deﬁnitions of regressors are summarized in Table 2.
4 Calibrating the Model
This section attempts to reconcile the general pricing model with the empirical ﬁndings
of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The following is key to the link between the model and
empirics.
Assumption 4 At every point through the lifetime of an option, the forecasts of the
regression models from [HHL99] and [HL96] provide a suﬃcient statistics for the current
exercise probability.
In other words, all systematic drivers of the exercise probability are assumed to be
correctly captured by the regression model. What remains — the noise of the regression
model — is equal to the remaining unhedgeable exercise risk.
4.1 Representative Setting
According to the options investigated in [HHL99] and [HL96], I develop a model for Amer-
ican call options on one underlying stock. The empirical results have high explanatory
power with respect to the response of individuals to stock price movements. Yet, a variety
of 7 ﬁrms is not enough to reliably investigate the inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (like
dividends, industry, ﬁrm size) or that of option characteristics (like option term, vesting
rules, hurdles). For instance, a shortening of the option term will probably increase the
mean exercise rate, simply because there is less time to exercise. The regression models
do not directly account for the option term, however. I seek to avoid misspeciﬁcation due
to unconsidered ﬁrm- or option-speciﬁc factors by choosing a representative setting that
is as close as possible to parameters from the sample. Hence, the model is not guaranteed
to provide plausible results in other settings as well. It is thus a good signal rather than
12Variable Name Type All Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Mean
Returns ret90,45 OLS -0.0111 -0.0104 -0.0123 -0.0151 -0.0172
-90 days to -45 -0.039 Tobit -0.0107 -0.0128 -0.012 -0.0158 -0.0197
Returns 0 ret45,30 OLS 0.0274 0.0292 0.0319 0.034 0.0347
-45 days to -30 0.0088 Tobit 0.0275 0.0325 0.036 0.0367 0.0382
Returns ret30,0 OLS 0.0231 0.0213 0.0245 0.0313 0.0328
-30 days to 0 0.013 Tobit 0.0257 0.0273 0.0314 0.0391 0.0416
Market-to-strike mts OLS 0.0104 0.0125 0.0106 0.0078 0.0061
ratio (cut at 5) 2.222 Tobit 0.0087 0.0137 0.0122 0.0103 0.008
Square of ~ mts2 OLS -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0009
5.385 Tobit -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0009
Volatility vola OLS 0.004 -0.0001 0.0082 0.0112 0.0121
0.393 Tobit 0.0039 -0.0037 0.0082 0.0118 0.0120
Fraction recently vest OLS 0.0077 0.0029 0.0082 0.0116 0.0086
vested 0.035 Tobit 0.0099 0.0033 0.0095 0.013 0.0108
Fraction of avail OLS 0.0063 0.0039 0.0057 0.0019 0.0085
grant available 0.344 Tobit 0.0076 0.0065 0.0082 0.0078 0.0175
Life left tleft OLS -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0009
5.692 Tobit -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0009
Fraction to canc OLS 0.1663 0.2632 0.2525 0.3262 0.238
be canceled 0.012 Tobit 0.1624 0.2824 0.2178 0.2571 0.1148
Table 1: R e gr ession estimates from Huddart and L ang [HL96, table 5, 6] “...[by em-
ployee level] of options exercised on stock price variables, options recently vested, options
available, life left, and options to be canceled.” The end of an event month serves as
reference time for returns. Accordingly, ret90,45 is the log stock price return between 60
and 15 days before beginning of the event month. Further deﬁnitions from [HL96, table
4]: “The unit of observation is a grant month. Statistics are for all grants with more than
ten grantees and all grant months with market-to-strike ratios in excess of one. There
are 5.060 such grant months. (...) Market-to-strike ratio is the lesser of ﬁve and the
ratio of the market price of the stock to the strike price of the option at the end of the
exercise month. Volatility is the standard deviation of log daily stock price returns over
the year prior to the grant month. Fraction recently vested is the number of options that
vested in the three months prior to the exercise month expressed as a fraction of options
granted for months in which the market-to-strike ratio exceeds 1.15, and zero otherwise.
Fraction of grant available is the ratio of options available to be exercised (i.e., vested and
unexercised) to the options granted as of the beginning of the exercise month. Life left is
the number of years remaining in the option life prior to expiration. Fraction to be can-
celed is the number of vested, unexercised options from a grant that will be canceled in the
coming three months, expressed as a fraction of the total grant.” Further deﬁnitions from
[HL96, table 6; indices adapted]: “Level 0 employees were among the top 5% of employees
receiving options at their company; level 1, among the next 20%; level 2, among the next
25%; and level 3, among the ﬁnal 50%.”
13Variable Mean Standard Coeﬃcient t-Statistic
deviation
EXER 0.0020 0.0081 — —
Intercept — — −0.00219 213
AVAIL 0.3695 0.2224 0.00264 14.6
CANCEL 0.0101 0.0367 0.05466 33.3
VEST 0.0785 0.1130 0.00108 3.9
RATIO 0.7673 0.1834 0.00251 12.9
RETWK1 0.0081 0.0573 0.01055 14.3
RETWK2 — — 0.01232 17.1
RETWK3 — — 0.00491 6.9
RETWK4 — — 0.00032 0.5
RET6MO1 0.1466 0.2619 0.00008 0.4
RET6MO2 0.0954 0.2823 −0.00075 24.8
MAX 0.2632 0.4404 0.00194 20.6
Adjusted R2 0.2849
Number of observations 12,145
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and regression from Heath, Huddart and Lang [HHL99,
table 3, 4]. Deﬁnitions: “There are 12,145 weekly observations of options exercised ex-
pressed as a fraction of options granted. EXER, AVAIL, CANCEL, and VEST are the
fraction of the total number of options awarded from a single grant that, relative to obser-
vation week, are as follows: exercised, available for exercise, and to be canceled within six
months; and, that have vested in the prior six months, respectively. RATIO is the diﬀer-
ence between the market price of the stock on the Monday of the observation week and the
strike price, divided by the option’s Barone-Adesi and Whaley [1987] value as of the same
date. RETWK1 is the return on the stock in the week prior to exercise. RET6MO1 is
the return on the stock over months −7 to −2, inclusive relative to the observation week.
RET6MO2 is the return on the stock over months −13 to −8, inclusive. Returns are the
logarithm of the ratio of closing stock prices on the days bracketing the relevant period.
MAX is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the stock price in the observation
week exceeds the maximum of the daily closing stock prices computed over trading days
−21 to −260, i.e., the maximum over the prior year excluding the month prior to the
observation week.”
14a stringent seal of approval if the SFAS pricing method turns out to be consistent with
my model in Section 5.1. Large inconsistency, in contrast, could disprove SFAS 123 to be
appropriate.
I will determine the price of a particular call option with the following characteristics:
The option runs from t =0to T =1 0y . It is not exercisable from grant until V =2yand
fully vested afterwards. There are no further exercise restrictions such as block periods
around ﬁnancial statement disclosures. The option is granted at the money, with a strike
price K equal to the normalized stock price X0 =1 0 0 . So the payoﬀ has the form
f (t,X)=I{t≥V } [Xt − K]
+.
I assume that the stock price path follows a stochastic diﬀerential equation
dXt = µXt dt + σXt dWt
with constant coeﬃcients, as in the Black/Scholes model. The drift µ =1 3 .5%, volatility
σ =4 1 .6%, and continuous dividend yield δ =3 .0% are set equal to the mean value over
the 7 publicly traded ﬁrms in [HL96, table 1]. The risk-free interest rate is set to r =7 % .
4.2 Modelling the Probability of Termination
The pricing formula price =
P
t e−rtEQ [f (t,X)P(τ = t|Ft)] i se v a l u a t e db yp a t hs i m -
ulation. To do that, I have to determine the termination probability P(τ = t|Ft) for
every drawn path X and every potential exercise time t ∈ {t1,...,t K}. I will specify
the probability in two diﬀerent ways, depending on whether the option is exercisable or
not: The regression models in Table 1 and 2 refer only to observations where the option
is in the money, where some of the options are vested, and where at least some of the
options remain to be exercised. Accordingly, I deﬁne an option to be exercisable in t
iﬀ f (t,X) > 0 and P(τ ≥ t|Ft) > 0. The following subsections deﬁne the termination
probability recursively, starting from t =0until T.
4.2.1 Exercisable Options
Given a path X and some t such that the option is exercisable, the regression returns a
crude exercise probability according to
p
∗
crude (t,X): =α + β1x1 (t,X)+···+ βnxn (t,X) (6)
15where xi (t,X) are the regressors of Table 1 and 2, respectively.13 Time t runs from 0 to
10 in 480 steps (denoted by ∆t), the quarter of a month each.14
Huddart and Lang [HL96] do not report the intercept of the regression analysis since
they are mainly interested in the identiﬁcation of the drivers of exercise intensity. Yet,
the general level of intensity is essential for pricing — it has strong impact on options being
exercised earlier or later, even on being exercised at all. I reconstruct the intercept from
mean values of the dependent variable and regressors. By taking the expectation on both
sides of (6), α is eliminated, ending up with
p
∗
crude (t,X)=Ep
∗
crude (t,X)+β1 (x1 (t,X) − Ex1 (t,X))+...+βn(xn(t,X) − Exn(t,X)).
(7)
The sample mean values from Table 1 and 2 now specify the equation in full, enabling
me to make numerical calculations.
It may happen in some cases that the regression will forecast values outside of [0,1],
which is not meaningful for probabilities. The model only makes sense if such cases are
negligible. Keeping this in mind, I simply “cap” and “ﬂoor” the values, setting
pcrude (t,X): =1∧ [p
∗
crude (t,X)]
+ ,
where a ∧ b =m i n( a,b).
4.2.2 Unexercisable Options
T h er e g r e s s i o nm o d e l sh a v en oe x p l a n a t o r yp o w e rf o rt h ec a s et h a tt h eo p t i o nc a n n o tb e
exercised. According to my deﬁnition, this is the case if P(τ ≥ t|Ft)=0or f (t,X)=
0. When the cumulative termination probability has reached 1 already, all subsequent
probabilities clearly must be zero. If not, i.e., if P(τ ≥ t|Ft)=0and f (t,X)=0 ,
options are assumed to be cancelled independently of FT at a constant hazard rate λ.
Independent cancellations before maturity account for the empirical fact that employees
who leave the ﬁrm usually have to exercise their ESOs shortly. If an option is out of
the money or unvested at that time, it is forfeited. For that reason, I set the constant
cancellation rate to λ =3 % , a value that is used by practitioners as a rule-of-thumb for
the ﬂu c t u a t i o no fs t a ﬀ. Section 7.1 in the appendix summarizes some evidence that 3%
13Note that all regressors refer to the past and present of stock price paths, besides deterministic
factors. Hence, p∗
crude (t,X) is Ft-measurable.
14Since the dependent variable of the regression in Table 1 is a monthly rate, the coeﬃcients are divided
by 4 in 6.
16is a good proxy for the large group of top managers (large if weighted by the number
of options granted). Obviously, the calibration of the model could be improved by a
regression model that includes cancellations directly. It is likely that ﬂuctuation rates are
negatively related with ﬁrm performance, so that the option cancellation rate might be
higher than 3%.
4.2.3 Recursion
Let p(t,X): =P(τ = t|Ft) be the (marginal) probability of termination at t.L e t f u r -
thermore pcanc := 1 − exp{−λ∆t} be the hazard rate of cancellations for one step and
denote by premain (t,X)=1 −
P
s≤t p(s,X) the probability of options not being terminated
until t (including t). The deﬁnition
p(t,X): =



pcrude (t,X) ∧ premain (t − ∆t,X):f (t,X) > 0
pcanc premain (t − ∆t,X): f (t,X)=0
(8)
fulﬁlls the above requirements (with formally setting premain (−∆t,X): =1 ). Capping
pcrude (t,X) with premain (t − ∆t,X) ensures that the cumulated termination probability
does not exceed one. Note that pcanc corresponds to a hazard rate, whereas pcrude (t,X)
is an unconditional probability, which is believed to account for the decline of exercisable
options through time in a correct way without further modiﬁcations.
The deﬁnition of p(t,X) ensures p(T,X) ≤ 1 but not p(T,X)=1in general, which
conﬂicts with the fact that each option must either be exercised or cancelled. If the option
expires out of the money, this is no problem for the determination of the price since the
lack of probability occurs in cases without payment. The case that the option matures in
the money is considered below in detail.
Finally, let me remark that the speciﬁcation of cancellation frequencies has large im-
pact on prices. Although such events contribute zero to expected option payoﬀs, more
frequent cancellations make premain run oﬀ earlier, setting all subsequent probabilities to
zero. Otherwise, subsequent steps could contribute valuable payoﬀs to expectation with
positive probability. Above that, cancellations inﬂuence subsequent p(t,X) via some
regressors, too.
4.3 Computing
The stock price process X is approximated by a recombining binomial tree of 480 time
steps. The simulation of X is conducted by drawing ups and downs over the tree under the
17physical measure. Given a realization of X, the probability p(t,X) is determined at each
t and added to the sum of probabilities of the corresponding node Xt from earlier simula-
tions that hit the same node. After 20.000 paths and normalization of the probabilities I
obtain an approximation of the joint distribution of (τ,Xτ) under the physical measure.
The moments are computed directly, whereas the pricing formula (5) is evaluated with
probabilities multiplied by the Radon/Nikodym derivative of each node.
4.4 Criteria of Consistency
Of course, I was initially doubtful whether a regression model that was not designed to
price an option gives plausible results in this context. Above, I stated that {p∗
crude (t,X) ∈ [0,1]}
should hold in nearly all cases. Furthermore, the distribution of (τ,Xτ) should have mo-
ments similar to those of the sample. I introduce two further criteria of consistency, both
of which concern the cumulative termination probability. I will check under what condi-
tions the outcome of the cancellation probability is consistent with the hypothesis of a
constant λ =3 % . It has become clear already that the model is automatically correct
if the total termination probability pcum (t,X): =1− premain (t,X) equals one for some
t ≤ T. The same is true if the option expires out of the money. If, possibly pcum (T,X) < 1
on such a path, the lack can be addressed to forfeitures at maturity, which are neither
recognized by the regressions nor in a causal connection with the ﬂuctuation of employees.
It does not matter whether the “lack” is removed by an extra-portion of cancellations at
T or not.
Suppose now that pcum (T,X) < 1 and f (T,XT) > 0. If the assumption of a given,
constant hazard rate of cancellations were perfectly true, one should observe pcum (T,X)=
1. Since this is not the case, I compute a hypothetical cancellation rate that would ﬁll
the gap between pcum (T,X) and 1.I ti sd e ﬁned as follows. Let q be the total probability
of exercise for a certain path, excluding termination. As speciﬁed above, cancellations
must go back to the vesting period and out of-the-money periods. Summing up the total
length of periods out of the money plus the vesting period to l,t h eimplicit cancellation
rate
λimpl (X): =−1/l ln(q)
deﬁnes the ﬁrst criterion of consistency. This rate is still constant in time but individual
to each path. It is meaningful only on the subsample of options expiring out of the money
and should take values close to the pre-speciﬁed λ if the model is calibrated well.
18The second criterion of consistency has the same idea behind but the scope is nar-
rower: Let A := {f (T,XT) > 0 for all t ∈ [V,T]} be the total of paths that keep the
option continuously in the money. If the model is miscalibrated, this should crop up
most strikingly on A where cancellations are limited to the vesting period [0,V].T h e
conditional cumulative probability of termination for such paths,
pcum,A := E
P (pcum (T,X )| A),
should be equal or close to one. I will refer to pcum,A =1as the all-in-the-money condition.
4.5 Final Calibration
I start with an attempt to choose empirical parameters without modiﬁcation. Expecta-
tions in (7) are set equal to the sample means from Table 1, coeﬃcients are those from
Column “all”, which are estimates on the whole sample of employees. Ep∗
crude (t,X)
equals 0.007, the mean monthly exercise rate as reported in [HL96]. The simulated
mean of p∗
crude (t,X) is biased upward to 0.0080, which is no problem from the outset
since simulated expectations of the regressors do just loosely correspond to the real-world
counterparts. That higher mean value is simply the forecast of the empirical model
in another situation. Many simulations of p∗
crude (t,X) however fail to be within [0,1].
There are more than 10% negative values. Furthermore, I observe pcum,A =0 .78 and
suppcum (T,X )=0 .87, both of them values that should plausibly approximate one. Al-
ternative coeﬃcients from Table 1 and 2 lead to similar results. I conclude that the overall
termination probability is clearly underestimated.
As a consequence, I limit the input that derives from empirics to regression coeﬃcients
henceforth, returning from (7) to the original regression equation (6). The intercept α is
not considered to be given by the regression anymore but calibrated such that the criteria
of consistency as speciﬁed above are met as good as possible.15 Figure 1 shows prices
for diﬀerent models that arise from a variation of the intercept. Here, the (resulting)
probability Ep∗
crude (t,X) i sm a p p e dt ot h ep r i c e .T h el e f te d g ea t0 . 7 0 %c o r r e s p o n d st o
the original calibration.
Negative exercise “probabilities” become negligible at a mean exercise probability in
excess of 0.9%. They occur in less than 1% of the sample, mostly combined with low
15Alternatively, one could also recalibrate the cancellation rate λ to ﬁll the gap between pcum,A =1
and the observed value of 0.78.B u t λ were to be set to 18%, which is much too high to be associated
with a rate of staﬀ turnover. Besides, resetting λ could not correct the problem of negative p∗
crude (t,X).
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Figure 1: Option prices, depending on the expectation of the monthly termination prob-
ability, determined under the physical measure of the pricing model. By variation of the
regression intercept, diﬀerent such expectations are obtained as well as diﬀerent prices.
The graph maps the expectation (“Mean Exercise Frequency”) to the price. The left edge
at 0.70% corresponds to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation of section 4.5. “HL96 OLS - all” denotes
prices for OLS regressions on the full sample in [HL96] (see Table 1). “HL96 TOBIT
- all” is the counterpart with tobit coeﬃcients. Prices of “HHL99 OLS” result from the
regression in [HHL99] (see Table 2). Price curves for regressions over subsamples ac-
cording to the employee level are very similar. “Amer. Call” denotes the unique price an
unrestricted investor would pay under assumptions of standard option pricing theory.
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Figure 2: Option prices depending on pcum,A, the cumulative termination probability, given
that the option is continuously in the money from vesting to maturity. Pairs of pcum,A and
price are obtained by variation of the regression intercept; pcum,A is determined under the
physical measure of the pricing model. The categories “OLS” and “TOBIT” refer to the
corresponding regression coeﬃcients from [HL96]; see Table 1. “HHL99” denotes prices
arising from coeﬃcients of Table 2, which stem from [HHL99]. The appendices “All” or
“Level i” refer to subsamples of diﬀerent employee level, sorted by the number of options
a person received. Level 0 are the top 5% of employees; Level 1, among the next 20%;
Level 2, among the next 25%; and Level 3, among the ﬁnal 50%.
payoﬀs.
By virtue of its rigor, I choose the all-in-the-money condition as the primary bench-
mark of consistency. As a preliminary analysis for that step, Figure 2 shows option prices
as a function of pcum,A instead of the mean exercise frequency as in Figure 1. Note that
point “1” in the abscissa refers to the lowest α that entails pcum,A =1 . For higher α,t h e
probability clearly stays constant at 1, while the price may decrease in α,a si ss e e ni n
Figure 1.
Switching from the mean exercise rate as common attribute of calibration to pcum,A
reduces most of the price diﬀerences between the models. Given some pcum,A ∈ [0.7, 1],
the maximal deviation of an individual model’s price from the mean over models is below
3.5%.
21In order to determine the ﬁnal option value, the intercept α is now chosen to be the
least value such that the all-in-the-money condition is met. The right edge of Figure 2
thus provides the option value of each model. In adapting α this way, I change the original
model as cautious as possible. Yet, higher α would result in consistent models as well,
except that the mean exercise frequency were even more distant from the empirical mean.
The implicit cancellation rate λimpl(X) s h o w sm e a nv a l u e sb e t w e e n3.5% and 5.9%,
which I consider to be in a reasonable scope.
5R e s u l t s
Table 3 summarizes prices and characteristics of the joint distribution of (τ,Xτ) for dif-
ferent model set-ups. Characteristics such as mean values under the physical measure and
the correlation of τ and Xτ are rather consistent across models. They roughly correspond
with their empirical counterparts.16
Prices according to diﬀerent regression models are quite similar in general. Option
holders capture about 72% of the value of a corresponding American option.17 Further-
more, options under the OLS models are — slightly, but systematically — less expensive
than under the tobit models. They show surprisingly low diﬀerences across employee
levels within each OLS / tobit model class. Models of rational option holders such as
Hall and Murphy [HM02] or Carpenter’s utility maximizing model [Car98] provide many
factors that potentially generate a diﬀe r e n c ei nt h ec o s to fa no p t i o nh e l db yat o pe x e c -
utive as opposed to a ﬂoor manager. Primary candidates for such factors are the utility
function, in combination with initial wealth, stock ownership, the degree of diversiﬁcation,
borrowing constraints, or the stochastic size of liquidity shocks relative to wealth. My
model suggests that these factors cancel each other out. Yet, there are eﬀects that could
generate a systematic dependency on employee level — under the same regression coeﬃ-
cients, but in another context. For instance, Huddart and Lang [HL96] conclude from a
higher sensitivity to historical volatility that lower-level employees are more risk-averse
on average than top executives. Simulated volatilities, however, vary much less than in
reality, which turns the sensitivity to volatility into a ﬁxed eﬀect. If I was introducing
16The empirical characteristics are recalculated in part from other ﬁgures in the descriptive statistics
of [HL96]. Hence, they are unreliable. For details, see the description of Table 3.
17Calculated according to the procedure of Barone-Adesi and Whaley [BAW87]. A vesting period of
two years can be neglected for the given stock price process.
22Regres- Emplo- Ep Price SFAS pex
cum Eτ EXτ ρ Eλimp (X)
sion yee Error
Type Level
96-OLS All 1.04% 37.25 −1.3% 51.7% 6.13 .07 14.2% 5.60%
96-OLS Lev. 0 1.43% 36.76 −3.4% 59.9% 5.52 .59 13.6% 3.50%
96-OLS Lev. 1 1.16% 37.46 −2.2% 56.0% 6.02 .89 14.4% 4.10%
96-OLS Lev. 2 1.05% 38.50 −1.3% 52.8% 6.83 .28 11.0% 4.50%
96-OLS Lev. 3 1.09% 37.62 −1.2% 54.6% 6.33 .05 14.4% 4.50%
96-TOB All 1.14% 38.61 −5.5% 50.4% 5.92 .98 −2.0% 5.90%
96-TOB Lev. 0 1.10% 38.70 −4.7% 51.5% 6.23 .02 2.5% 5.20%
96-TOB Lev. 1 1.12% 38.48 −5.0% 51.4% 6.02 .97 2.6% 5.40%
96-TOB Lev. 2 1.13% 39.26 −5.4% 51.4% 6.33 .05 −4.5% 5.10%
96-TOB Lev. 3 1.12% 37.45 −3.7% 53.5% 5.72 .85 10.8% 5.30%
HHL99 All 1.16% 38.63 −4.8% 56.6% 6.12 .82 4.9% 3.80%
directly from the sample – – – ≈6.7 2.22 ≈20% –
PriceSFAS (sample inputs) 37.94
PriceAmerican 51.21
Table 3: Prices and selected characteristics of the probability law of termination arising
from diﬀerent regression models. The intercept of all regression equations was taken to
be the least value such that the cumulative probability of termination, given the option
was completely in the money, just equals one. “96” refers to the coeﬃcients of [HL96],
to be found in Table 1, whereas “HHL99” denotes those from [HHL99]. For the meaning
of the employee level subsamples, see Figure 2. The lower the ﬁgure, the higher the level
of the employees. All characteristics are expectations under the physical measure of the
corresponding pricing model — except price. Ep is the mean monthly exercise probability.
“SFAS Error” denotes the proportional deviation of the option price according to SFAS
123 from the model price, given that the latter is true: SFAS prices are derived from
Black/Scholes prices with a maturity equal to expected option lifetime, given that it vests.
The result is multiplied by the probability that the option vests, here exp{−2λ}. pex
cum
denotes the probability of exercise over the full option lifetime. Eτ is the mean exercise
time and EXτ the mean stock price performance at exercise, ρ denotes the correlation
of τ and Xτ. All means are computed under the condition that the option is exercised.
Eλimp (X) is the mean implicit cancellation rate. Row 3 from below reports reference
values of the descriptive statistics in [HL96, tables 1, 3, 4]. The mean exercise time is
an unweighted average over ﬁrms, the correlation is privately reported by Steven Huddart.
PriceSFAS (sample inputs) gives the SFAS price for a mean exercise time of 6.7 and a
probability of vesting at exp{−2λ}.P r i c e American is the option price according to the
procedure of Barone-Adesi and Whaley [BAW87].
23stochastic volatility into the probability law of X,d i ﬀerences in the sensitivity to volatility
could become more important. With all due care, one could argue as follows. Given that
volatility tends to persist some time, a higher sensitivity leads the option holder to forfeit
more option time value18 in turbulent times since more options are exercised just when the
option has a high time value. Altogether, an introduction of stochastic volatility should
reduce the option value under high sensitivity to volatility as opposed to low sensitivity.
5.1 Testing the Accounting Standard
This section tests whether the SFAS pricing method accounts for the most important
factors. Recall that the SFAS method has two exercise related input parameters: the
probability that an option vests and the mean lifetime of an option, given that it vests.
Do these parameters capture the major part of factors inﬂuencing the “true” value? Of
course, there is no such truth, just other models. If one believes, as I do, that it is
important to achieve a good ﬁt with empirics, my model is interesting since it nearly
exactly replicates the empirical results of the regressions. So I validate a two-factor
model with a ten- or eleven-factor model, depending on the number of regressors in use.
The usual procedure would be to estimate the exercise related inputs for both models
on the same sample, and to compare the corresponding prices. To compute the SFAS
price, I take the average across ﬁrm-speciﬁc exercise times from [HL96] as a proxy for the
mean lifetime, given vesting. For lack of data on options cancelled before vesting, I set
this probability equal to exp{−Vλ } =e x p{−0.06}, in accordance with the assumption
λ =3 %in my model. The resulting SFAS price of 37.94 is located in the middle of
the regression model prices, suggesting so far that the SFAS method is a strikingly good
proxy. Of course, it must be noticed that the representative setting is quite special. For
the lack of data, I cannot carry out further checks.
In a second test, I assume my model to be true. Computing the mean exercise time
under my model, I get SFAS prices, the proportional errors of which are listed in Table 3.
A systematic but low downward bias and very low variance add further evidence about
the impressive accuracy of the SFAS method.
I also test other stock price volatilities because σ is a delicate point in my model. The
intercept is recalibrated to meet the all-in-the-money condition for every volatility chosen.
18From the perspective of the “risk-neutral” option writer.
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Figure 3: Model prices and SFAS prices for diﬀerent volatilities. Other parameters are
kept constant at the values of the representative setting (Section 4.1). The regression
model’s intercept α is ﬁtted to fulﬁll the all-in-the-money condition of consistency. Prices
according to SFAS 123 are computed under the assumption that my model were true. For
the notation of model speciﬁcations, see Figure 1. The coeﬃcients stem from estimates
across all employee levels.
Figure 3 shows that the pricing error is stable.
5.2 What Driver Is Relevant?
This section investigates if really all regressed exercise drivers are important for option
valuation. For instance, short-term returns are suspected of being irrelevant since a
positive return (increasing the exercise probability if βi > 0)i so ﬀset by a mirror-inverted
negative one (decreasing the probability) in most nodes. Because short-term returns are
nearly uncorrelated with other factors, — especially with payoﬀ — the contribution to the
expected payoﬀ of such a return is presumably a constant, regardless of its βi.
The following modiﬁcation of regression models aims at changing the sensitivity to
a single regressor, while keeping the left-hand side of the regression at a constant mean
value. In doing so, I seek to give an answer to the following question: “Do I need to know
to what degree single values of a factor drive single values of exercise probability, or is
it enough to know the impact of the factor’s mean on mean exercise probability?” If the
sensitivity to a regressor appears to be irrelevant for prices, the inﬂuence of the regressor
25is fully captured by a constant. In the set-up of Section 4.5, even the constant becomes
irrelevant since it is superimposed by calibration of the intercept α.
The sensitivity to regressor i is changed by altering βi. The expectation of p∗
crude (t,X),
however, shall be invariant, which is achieved by a formal rearrangement of (6) to
p
∗
crude (t,X)=µ0 + β1 (x1 (t,X) − µ1)+...+ βn (xn (t,X) − µn) (9)
with µ1,..., µn ∈ R. The constant µ0 is set equal to the expected exercise probability
under the simulation (denoted by EP ...). In other words, I set µ0 := EPp∗
crude (t,X),
given that α h a sb e e nc a l i b r a t e dt of u l ﬁll the all-in-the-money condition. If, furthermore,
µi = E
Pxi (t,X) (10)
for i =1 ,...,n, equation (9) is still equivalent to the original regression model (6).
Except µ0, each term on the right side has expectation zero, implying that EPp∗
crude (t,X)
is invariant to a change in βi.
Equation (10) is not easily achieved since the regressors are interdependent: At t,t h e
regression variable avail19 equals pcum (t − ∆t,X ), which is a function of earlier values
p∗
crude (s,X).T h ev a r i a b l ecanc := avail I{t≥T−0.25} introduces further dependencies. So
all regression equations are linked, albeit not strongly since the corresponding βi are small.
Let some µ =( µ1,...,µ n) ∈ Rn be given. Formally, (10) is fulﬁlled exactly when a ﬁxed
point of the mapping µ 7→
¡
EPx1 (t,X),...,EPxn (t,X)
¢
is found. Because that mapping
is a contraction, I can start with a µ equal to the expected values from [HL96] and iterate
the process of entering µ into (9), computing expectations EPxi (t,X), re-entering them
as new µ and so forth. While µ0 is kept constant at the goal level, µ converges to a ﬁxed
point, whereas EPp∗
crude (t,X) tends to µ0. In practice, about four iterations are needed
to get a suﬃciently stable µ.
So far, nothing has been changed except that α from (6) is now split into pieces
fulﬁlling (10). I am now in a position to investigate the price eﬀect of an expectation-
neutral change of coeﬃcients βi in (9). If the price does not react, the corresponding
regressor can be left out.
Because of the obvious interaction between the market-to-strike ratio and its square,
which is a regressor, too, I rearrange equation (9) once more such that the new coeﬃcients
can be interpreted as steepness and convexity of the dependence on the market-to-strike
ratio (see appendix, Section 7.4).
19See Table 1 and 2.
26Figure 4 shows how the price reacts to a change in βi for the models of Table 1.
Within each column, the modiﬁed coeﬃcient takes values in a geometric sequence from
0.25βi (left edge) via βi (center) to 4βi (right edge). A ﬂat curve signals low relevance of
sensitivity to the corresponding exercise driver. As expected, short-term returns play a
minor role. The low impact of the sensitivity to volatility must be interpreted with care
since the variance of historical volatility over one year, based on monthly returns, is too
low within the model to have any eﬀect. The irrelevance of vest, the fraction of options
recently vested, is surprising for the moment since the basic coeﬃcient is in the same order
as that of avail. But the variable is unequal zero only within a quarter after vesting, so
that the small number of relevant observations does not have much power. I conclude
that the complexity can be downsized to considering ﬁve variables. The most important
driver, mts, depends just on the current stock price. However, the path dependency that
comes into play by avail cannot be resolved.
An analysis of the model from Table 2 gives similar results (Figure 5). Again, all
short-term returns are negligible, as well as vest.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I present a new pricing model for employee stock options. The general
version is able to react to a principally unlimited number of factors driving exercises and
cancellations of options. I show that the model can be calibrated by regression analyses
of the exercise frequency done by Heath, Huddart and Lang20.
The valuation method of the accounting standard SFAS 123 is validated with my
model as a reference. Given the model is true, the corresponding SFAS prices — computed
with inputs gained from my model — are strikingly similar, suggesting that the SFAS
method captures all essential features of exercise behavior well. Of course, the result is
limited to plain call options similar to those in the regression sample.
B a s e do ns e p a r a t er e g r e s s i o n sf o rd i ﬀerent employee levels, I compute option values
assignable to top executives and groups of subordinates. I ﬁnd no evidence that the
diﬀerences in exercise behavior have implications on the option value. A further analysis
shows that only a part of exercise-driving factors is essential for the determination of
prices.
20See [HL96] and [HHL99].
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Figure 4: Expectation-neutral variation of OLS regression coeﬃcients βi from [HL96].
Within each column, βi is changed in a geometric sequence from 0.25βi (left edge) via βi
(center) to 4βi (right edge). For the deﬁnition of regressors and the precise meaning of
the subsamples “All” ... “Level 3”, which correspond to the employee level, see Table 1.
The coeﬃcients for “mts” are in fact γ1 and γ2 from section 7.4 in the appendix, which
can be interpreted as steepness and convexity of the dependence on the market-to-strike
ratio.
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Figure 5: Expectation-neutral variation of OLS regression coeﬃcients βi from [HHL99].
Within each column, βi is changed in a geometric sequence from 0.25βi (left edge) via βi
(center) to 4βi (right edge). For the deﬁnition of regressors, see Table 2.
29This paper leaves room for improvement in many respects. Tailoring the regression
analysis to meet the needs of my pricing model would make the results more signiﬁcant.
First, a logit or probit regression is more appropriate than a linear model, since its forecast
is a probability from the outset. Second, cancellations are both informative and price-
relevant so that the termination rate (exercise plus cancellation) should be the dependent
variable. Third, I suspect option-speciﬁc factors (such as vesting time) and employee-
speciﬁc factors (such as time to retirement) of being heavily price-relevant. It would be
interesting to take them into consideration, in particular since some of the factors could
be observed by outsiders.
Further evidence should be added to the relation between the regression model and
the FASB method. It well may be that the price discrepancy between the SFAS price and
the model price is larger under other conditions.
In addition to the primary goal of ESO valuation, the model is an appropriate starting
point for the analysis of rent-extracting exercises, conducted by managers who possess
private information on the future ﬁrm value.
7 Appendix
7.1 Some Evidence on Management Turnover
This section summarizes some empirical results on the turnover of managers in several
countries, in order to support the choice of λ =3 %for the continuous hazard rate of
cancellations. The link between cancellations and turnover relies on the fact that currently
unexercisable options are typically forfeited if an option holder leaves the ﬁrm. The
turnover of top executives, as collected here, might be less representative for all employee
levels. Yet, the weight of options received by the top group is very large in most cases.
B o a r dm e m b e r sa r eo f t e nt h eo n l yg r a n t e e s .
Hadlock and Lumer [HL97] report an annual rate of 3.8% for CEOs from a sample of
259 U.S. ﬁrms. Kaplan [Kap94] compares the CEO turnover in large U.S. and Japanese
ﬁrms, resulting in rates of 2.2% (Japan) and 2.9% (U.S.), provided that CEOs who enter
the supervisory board are left out. I assume that they may continue to hold the options.
Kang and Shivdasani [KS95] ﬁnd 3.1% p.a. for Japanese ﬁrms when the turnover is cor-
rected for executives remaining on the board. The U.S. sample of Denis, Denis and Sarin
30[DDS97] yields a weighted mean rate of 7.5%, yet it is not corrected in the above sense.
The same problem holds for the rate of 9.2% from Mikkelson and Partch [MP97], where
CEO turnover in unacquired U.S. ﬁr m si sm e a s u r e do v e rt e ny e a r s . D a h y a ,M c C o n n e l l
and Travlos [DMT02] report a forced CEO turnover at rates between 2.7% and 5% from
a dataset of 470 industrial ﬁrms in the U.K.
7.2 Equivalence of Conditional Independence and K-Assump-
tion
Lemma 5 Conditional independence and the K-assumption are equivalent.
Proof. Let the K-assumption hold and let B be some Borel set in C. Then, for t ≥ 0,
P(τ>t , X∈ B|Ft)=P(P(τ>t , X∈ B|FT)|Ft)
= P
¡
1{X∈B}P(τ>t |FT)|Ft
¢
= P
¡
1{X∈B}P(τ>t |Ft)|Ft
¢
(K-assumption)
= P(τ>t |Ft)P(X ∈ B|Ft),
which means that X and τ are conditionally independent. If, conversely, the latter holds,
and P(X ∈ B|Ft) > 0,t h e n
P(τ>t |X ∈ B,Ft)=P(τ>t |Ft). (11)
Since all Borel sets B span FT (when augmented), the left side of (11) may be extended
to P(τ>t |FT), which yields the K-assumption.
7.3 The Exercise Probability Under the Change of Measure
Lemma 6 Let the pricing kernel dQ/dP be integrable and Ft-measurable. (This can, for
instance, be achieved by suﬃciently smooth coeﬃcients and non-degenerate diﬀusion of
the stochastic diﬀerential equation driving X, which enables ln(dQ/dP) to be represented
as a stochastic integral in terms of X.) The K-assumption or, equivalently, conditional
independence implies
P(τ = t|Ft)=Q(τ = t|Ft).
31Proof. Let Y be some bounded, Ft-measurable random variable. Then
Z
P(τ = t|Ft)Yd Q =
Z
P(τ = t|FT )Yd Q (K-assumption)
=
Z
P(τ = t|FT ) Y
dQ
dP | {z }
FT-measur.
dP
=
Z
I{τ=t}Y
dQ
dP
dP (deﬁnition of P(·| F T ))
=
Z
I{τ=t}Yd Q,
which means that P(τ = t|Ft) meets the deﬁnition of Q(τ = t|Ft). Uniqueness of the
latter entails identity.
7.4 Separating Steepness and Convexity for mts
Let M be the market-to-strike ratio. It enters the regression model (9) by two instances:
directly, as M,a n da sM2. When the importance of the regressors is analyzed in Section
5.2, the obvious interaction of M and M2 are not to be neglected. I rewrite (9) such that
new coeﬃcients give rise for a more intuitive interpretation. Starting with an excerpt of
the right side of (9), β1 (M − µ1)+β2 (M2 − µ2),w h e r eµi are the expected values of M
and M2,Is e t
f (M): =β1 (M − µ1)+β2
¡
M
2 − µ2
¢ ! = γ1 (M − µ1)+γ2
¡
(M − µ1)
2 − µ2
¢
. (12)
By taking expectation on both sides I get µ2 = EP (M − µ1)
2 = µ2 − (µ1)
2. Since (12)
must hold for all M, it follows that γ2 = β2 and γ1 = β1 +2 µ1β2.N o w , ∂
∂Mf (µ1),t h e
steepness at the mean value of M, is independent of γ2. Given that the distribution of
M −µ1 is symmetric, even the mean steepness EP ∂
∂Mf (M) is untouched of γ2,s i n c et h e
derivative is then antisymmetric around µ1. Because ∂2
∂M2f (M) is totally independent of
γ1, it is legitimate to interpret γ1 and γ2 as separate coeﬃcients of the model’s steepness
and convexity with regard to the market-to-strike ratio.
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